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Data from college admissions tests can provide a valuable measure of student achievement, but the
non-representativeness of test-takers is an important concern. We examine selectivity bias in both
state-level and school-level SAT and ACT averages.  The degree of selectivity may differ importantly
across and within schools, and across and within states.  To identify within-state selectivity, we use
a control function approach that conditions on scores from a representative test.  Estimates indicate
strong selectivity of test-takers in "ACT states," where most college-bound students take the ACT,
and much less selectivity in SAT states.  To identify within- and between-school selectivity, we take
advantage of a policy reform in Illinois that made taking the ACT a graduation requirement.  Estimates
based on this policy change indicate substantial positive selection into test participation both across
and within schools.  Despite this, school-level averages of observed scores are extremely highly correlated
with average latent scores, as across-school variation in sample selectivity is small relative to the underlying
signal.  As a result, in most contexts the use of observed school mean test scores in place of latent
means understates the degree of between-school variation in achievement but is otherwise unlikely




















Selection Bias in College Admissions Test Scores 
 
I. Introduction 
Data from the two leading college admissions tests—the SAT and the ACT—can provide 
a valuable measure of student achievement for researchers studying the economics of education.  
Both the SAT and ACT have been administered in approximately the same forms for several 
decades, to students from nearly every high school.  This permits comparisons between and 
within states, in cross-section and over time.  This is an important advantage over alternative 
tests administered by individual states or school districts, which change frequently and differ 
substantially across space. 
A central concern about the use of ACT and SAT scores for research is the non-
representativeness of test-takers.  Both exams are taken primarily by college-bound students, 
who most likely perform better than would their non-college-bound peers.  As a result, 
comparisons of mean SAT or ACT scores between states or between schools may be misleading 
about mean latent scores – that is, the average that would be observed were scores available for 
all students.  Previous researchers have concluded that state-level mean SAT scores are 
substantially biased by selection, and have suggested selection-correction procedures for state-
level data (Dynarski, 1987; Dynarski and Gleason, 1993).  These rely on strong exclusion 
restrictions, and fail to make an important distinction between states where the SAT is the 
dominant exam and those where the ACT is dominant and only the strongest students (who hope 
to attend out-of-state colleges) take the SAT.  There is no evidence available about within-school 
selection, and therefore little guidance for researchers conducting analyses with test score 
microdata (see, e.g., Krueger and Whitmore, 2001; Card and Payne, 2002; Rothstein, 2006; 
Abraham and Clark, 2006; and Hanushek and Taylor, 1990).    
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We provide new evidence on the selectivity of test participation, with an eye toward the 
impact of selection on measured mean SAT and ACT scores.  We distinguish between selection 
within and between schools; with substantial sorting of students across schools, the degree of 
selection into test-taking may differ across these two margins.   
We begin by examining state-level test score averages, for which the relevant selectivity 
combines between- and within-school selection in the state.  Dynarski (1987) documents a strong 
negative across-state correlation between SAT participation rates and mean scores.  We show 
that this largely reflects the contrast between what we call “SAT states,” where most college-
bound seniors take the SAT rather than the ACT, and “ACT states,” where traditionally only 
students hoping to attend elite, private, out-of-state colleges took the SAT.  Among SAT states, 
there is relatively little evidence of selectivity of test participation.  However, in ACT states both 
ACT- and (especially) SAT-takers are quite highly selected.  To evaluate the exclusion 
restriction needed to identify selectivity from cross-sectional data, we also examine a “control 
function” estimator that uses state-level scores on the NAEP exam, administered to a random 
sample of students in each state, to absorb potential correlations between test participation rates 
and average latent achievement.  This yields very similar estimates, suggesting that the pure 
cross-sectional estimator is sufficient to identify the selectivity of test participation. 
We then turn to an analysis of selectivity within and between schools, within states.  An 
important concern is that school-level test participation rates may be correlated with the 
unobserved quality of the school or of its students.  Indeed, estimates based on observational 
variation in test participation yield the implausible result that test-takers are negatively selected 
within schools, while those based on changes in participation rates over time indicate little 
selectivity.    
3
                                                
These results suggest that an exogenous source of variation in test participation is needed 
to identify the selectivity parameter of interest.  We take advantage of a policy reform in Illinois 
that substantially increased ACT participation rates but, plausibly, did not have important effects 
on underlying student achievement.  Beginning with the high school class of 2002, the ACT 
exam was required for graduation; the participation rate in 2002 was 99%, up from 71% in 2001. 
The impact of the new requirement varied substantially across schools, with larger increases in 
participation rates in schools that initially had low participation—so were far from compliance—
and smaller increases in schools that already participated at high rates.  Initial participation rates 
covaried strongly with the school racial composition, with a strong positive association between 
the school white share and the participation rate in 2000.  This association was substantially 
attenuated by 2004.  Racial composition is thus a strong predictor of the change in participation 
rates between 2000 and 2004.
1  Under the plausible assumption that the relationship between a 
school’s racial composition and the latent achievement of its students did not change over this 
four-year period, the former is a valid instrument for the change in participation rates. Results 
from this analysis indicate strong positive selection into test participation, both within and across 
schools:  Schools with the highest mean latent achievement have the highest participation rates, 
and within schools those students who would score highest are most likely to write the exam.  
In our concluding section, we consider the implications of our estimates for analyses that 
do not have access to natural experimental variation in test participation.  Across-school 
variation in latent test scores is large relative both to within-school variation and to variation in 
test participation rates, and is highly correlated with the latter.  As a consequence, observed mean 
scores are nearly perfectly correlated with latent means, though less variable.  As a result, 
school-level analyses that fail to account for selectivity are likely to yield attenuated 
 
1 It is not, however, a strong predictor in states that did not undergo a policy change.  
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relationships between test scores and other variables, but if a straightforward correction for this 
attenuation is made there are unlikely to be large additional biases.  
 
II.  Data 
Our primary data come from microdata samples of SAT and ACT-takers, matched to the 
high schools that they attended.  Our SAT data set includes 100 percent of test-takers in 
California and Texas, 100 percent of black and Hispanic test-takers, and a 25 percent random 
sample of test-takers of other races.  The ACT data set includes 50 percent of non-white students 
and a 25 percent of white students who took the ACT exam.
2  We focus on school- and state-
level mean scores on each exam.  Our school-level analyses use data on students who graduated 
from high school in 1996, 2000, and 2004; we focus on 1996 data for our state-level analysis. 
The SAT reports two subscores for each student, math and verbal, and a composite score.  
Each of the subscores is reported on a scale with mean 500 and standard deviation around 100 
among tested students (with a maximum score of 800 and a minimum of 200).  We focus on the 
sum of math and verbal scores, which has mean 1000 and standard deviation around 200.  The 
ACT reports several subscores, including one for a natural science subtest that has no SAT 
analogue.  We focus on the ACT “composite” score that averages over all subjects.  We convert 
this from its native scale (ranging from 1 to 36) to the more familiar SAT scale.
3   
The SAT and ACT are competing exams, and market shares vary substantially across 
states.  In some states—the Northeast, some of the South, and the Pacific coast—most college-
 
2 In both data sets, minority students were over-sampled to permit more accurate 
estimation of race-specific models.  Due to errors in the processing of the data files, students who 
failed to report a race are missing from the SAT data (except in California and Texas, where they 
are included) but are sampled at a 100 percent rate in the ACT data.   
3 The concordance comes from Dorans (1999).  The correlation between the state-level 
ACT averages constructed from the student-level data and averages reported by the ACT 
Corporation is 0.98.   
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bound students take the SAT, while in others—the Midwest and Plains, and portions of the 
South—the ACT is more common.  Colleges that enroll primarily nearby students (public 
universities, for example) typically prefer the dominant test in their state, while national, elite 
universities tend to prefer the SAT but often accept either.  When a college will accept either test 
score, students can sometimes arbitrage between the two, taking both tests and reporting only the 
higher score.
4  As a result, students who take the less-popular test in their state—particularly 
SAT-takers in ACT states—tend to be those who hope to attend the most selective schools. 
State-level test participation rates come from The Digest of Education Statistics (National 
Center for Education Statistics, various years) for the SAT and from the ACT Corporation 
(2003) for the ACT.  We define a state as an “ACT state” if its ACT participation rate exceeds 
40% and as an “SAT state” if the SAT participation rate exceeds this threshold.
5  We also use 
state-level mean scores from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP; National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2006) mathematics exam administered to 8
th graders in 1992, 
merged to SAT and ACT data from 1996—the same cohort of students four years later.  
Both the SAT and ACT micro data sets contain high school identifiers that can be linked 
to records from the Common Core of Data (CCD), an annual census of public schools.
6  From 
the CCD, we extract the number of 12
th graders at the school, the racial composition, and the 
fraction of students receiving free school lunches.  Because sampling rates are so high in both the 
SAT and ACT data, the simple ratio of the number of (weighted) observations at the school in 
 
4 The tests’ content differs somewhat, with more of a focus on knowledge rather than 
aptitude on the ACT, so a student may select into the test on which he has a comparative 
advantage. Scores can also be manipulated by re-taking the same exam, as most colleges 
consider only the highest score (Vigdor and Clotfelter, 2003).  Our data report the last recorded 
score on each exam.  We cannot link individual observations between the SAT and ACT data, so 
are unable to measure how much overlap there is between participation on the two exams. 
5 No state exceeds both thresholds, while two—Arizona and Nevada—exceed neither and 
are counted toward neither category.  See the online Appendix. 
6 Our school-level analysis excludes private schools.  
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our test-taker data sets to the number of 12
th graders provides an accurate estimate of the 
participation rate at all but the smallest schools.
7  All of our school-level analyses exclude 
schools with participation rates below 0.02. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the school-level data sets.  Average SAT scores 
are much higher in ACT states than in SAT states.  The same is true, to a much lesser degree, for 
ACT scores in SAT states.  Within SAT states, however, schools with high participation rates 
tend to have higher scores than those with low participation rates, on both the SAT and the ACT.  
Similarly, within ACT states, schools with high participation rates tend to have higher scores 
than those with low participation rates on both exams.  
 
III.  A Model of Self-Selection and Average Test Scores  
College entrance exams are not compulsory, and students who take them incur both 
financial and time costs – perhaps $45 for test registration, plus several hours on a Saturday 
morning to take the exam.  For students who do not plan to attend college or who plan to apply 
only to non-selective colleges that do not require entrance exam scores, there are few benefits to 
offset these costs.  By contrast, students who hope to attend a selective college will likely find 
that the benefits exceed the costs. 
Let μij be the net benefit of taking the exam for student i from group j (where a group 
might be a school or a state).  Let θj be the mean of this in group j, so that uij = μij – θj has mean 
 
7 Students who take exams prior to 12
th grade are coded by the year they attend 12
th grade 
– a student who takes the SAT or ACT as an 11
th grader in 2003 is counted toward the 2004 
participation measure. The ratio of test takers to 12
th grade enrollment overstates the cohort 
participation rate in schools with large dropout rates.  To address this, our denominator for the 
participation rate is the maximum of the number of 12
th graders and the average number of 
students per grade in grades 9 through 12.  The latter average excludes grades with very low 
enrollment, defined as those with enrollment less than 10% of total enrollment in grades 9-12 at 
the school.  In the schools where still we count more test-takers than students, we set the 
participation rate to 1 if the difference is less than 10% and drop the school otherwise. zero in each group.  θj will tend to be higher in schools where more students are college bound; 
within schools, uij will be higher among the college bound than among students not planning to 
attend college.  Both θj and uij may vary across tests as well, and θj will generally be higher for 
the test preferred by local public universities.  Students for whom the net benefits of taking the 
exam are positive (μij > 0, or uij > -θj) will take the exam.   
Let αj be the average achievement of students in group j, and let tij
* = αj + εij (where εij 
has mean zero in each group) be the latent achievement of student i.  For many analytical 
purposes, it would be useful to observe αj, and this is the parameter of interest for our 
investigation of selectivity of test participation.  Unfortunately, when test participation is non-
random, this is not observed.  Instead, the average of observed scores is  
(1)  t j = αj + E[εij | μij > 0] = αj + E[εij | uij > -θj]. 
The final term here is the mean of εij among students for whom the net benefit of test 
participation is positive.  Because benefits and latent achievement are unlikely to be independent 
– students who hope to attend college probably have higher achievement levels than those who 
do not – this will in general be non-zero.  As a consequence, analyses that take t j as a measure of 
average achievement in group j may be uninformative about the determinants and consequences 
of true average achievement, αj. 
If εij and uij are assumed to be bivariate normal with correlation ρ within each group j, 




































then the group-level participation rate, pj, indicates the mean test taking propensity in the group:  
pj = Pr(μij > 0) = Pr(uij > -θj) = Φ(θj), so θj = Φ
-1(pj).   This gives (1) a convenient form: 
(3)  t j = αj + ρ * σ * λ(pj), 
 
7where λ(p) ≡ φ(Φ
-1(p)) / p is the Inverse Mills Ratio (hereafter, IMR) and φ() and Φ() are the 
standard normal PDF and CDF, respectively.
8  Thus, if β = ρσ were known, the true mean 
achievement in group j could be recovered:  αj = t j - β * λ(pj). The challenge is in obtaining a 
consistent estimate of β.
9   
 
IV.  Alternative Empirical Strategies for Identifying the Selectivity of Test Participation 
We examine several strategies for identifying within-group selectivity.  These differ in 
their imposed assumptions about the between-school relationship between latent performance 
and test participation.  
A.  Cross-sectional analysis 
We begin with the case where only a single cross section of test scores is observed.  The 
only available strategy for estimating β is via a regression of group average observed scores on 
the group-level IMR: 
(4)  t j = α + λ(pj) β + ((αj – α) + e j). 
This yields a consistent estimate of β if and only if αj is uncorrelated with λ(pj).
 10   
                                                 
8 This is a well-known framework, introduced by Gronau (1974).  See also Heckman 
(1979).  Normality of student achievement within schools is a plausible assumption.  Normality 
of u is not restrictive:  If F(u) is the true CDF of net benefits of test-taking within the school, one 
can always convert u to a normal distribution with v=Φ
-1(F(u)).  In this framework, ρ is defined 
as corr(ε, v) rather than corr(ε, u).  The assumption that ε and u are bivariate normal is somewhat 
more restrictive, but also plausible.  We present diagnostic analyses in the Appendix which 
suggest that the distributional assumption is approximately correct. 
9 Given β, the two components ρ and σ can be readily distinguished from the within-




-1(p)].  Inference on ρ and σ is somewhat complex.  We focus on inference 
for β; since σ > 0, β = 0 if and only if ρ = 0. 
10 Sampling error in pj is negligible in our data, and the estimates of the sampling error of 
β reported below neglect it.  When we take account of it using the approach proposed by Murphy 
and Topel (1985), the estimated variance of the coefficients of (4) is essentially unchanged. 
 
8This strategy assumes away between-school selectivity:  While participation rates may 
vary across groups, there a group’s participation rate (or a monotonic function of it) must be 
uncorrelated with its average latent achievement.  This is not particularly plausible.  There are 
likely unobserved factors that vary across groups and influence both the test participation rate 
and average performance.  For example, suppose that groups are schools, and that one school 
enrolls academically-strong, college-bound students while another enrolls weaker students who 
are less likely to want to attend college.  The former school will have higher αj and θj (so lower 
λ(pj)) than the latter, producing a downward bias in β and leading to an underestimate of the 
degree of within-school selectivity of test participation. 
B.  Control function estimator 
If a proxy for latent mean performance is available, bias deriving from non-independence 
of group-level participation rates and latent achievement can be reduced.  We can write: 
(5)  t j = α + λ(pj) β + Xj κ + ((αj – Xj κ ) + e j), 
where α + Xjκ is the best linear predictor of αj given proxy Xj.  The bias in a regression of t j on 
λ(pj) and Xj depends on the variance of (αj – Xjκ) and on its correlation with λ(pj).  The better the 
proxy, the smaller will be the remaining variance in achievement, and therefore the bias.  
C.  First-differenced estimates 
School-level proxies for latent achievement are rarely available, and other methods are 
necessary.  One option is to take advantage of multiple observations on the selection-test score 
relationship at the same school from different years.  The difference between the expressions for 
school mean scores given by (4) in t=0 and t=1 is 
(6)  t j1 – t j0 = (λ(pj1) – λ(pj0)) β + ((αj1 – αj0) + (e j1 – e j0)). 
This first-differenced regression estimates β without bias if  




That is, while there may be a cross-sectional correlation between a school’s IMR and its latent 
average score, there can be no correlation between the change in a school’s IMR and the change 
in its latent mean score.
11  This assumption is somewhat more plausible than the corresponding 
assumption about levels, but absent an exogenous source of variation in IMRs it is still 
problematic:  School quality (and the quality of a school’s students) presumably evolves over 
time, producing shifts in both αjt and λ(pjt). 
D.  First-differenced estimates, with instruments 
Let Zj be a variable that predicts the change in IMRs.  If Zj is uncorrelated with the 
change in latent performance, it can serve as an instrument in (6), allowing for consistent 
estimation of β.  Below, we form such an instrument by taking advantage of a policy change in 
Illinois that mandated that all high school graduates starting with the class of 2002 take the ACT.  
Because demographic characteristics of schools were correlated with pre-implementation 
participation rates, the “bite” of these policies varied with school demographics.  In particular, 
schools with higher minority shares had lower pre-implementation participation rates and larger 
increases in participation (and larger reductions in IMRs) surrounding implementation of the 
policy.
12  Of course, minority share is correlated with mean latent test scores, but it is plausible 
that the base-year minority share is uncorrelated with the change in mean latent scores 
surrounding the implementation of the policies.  If so, this base-year minority share forms a valid 
instrument for the change in IMRs surrounding the policy implementation. 
Of course, the interpretation of the IMR coefficient in a model for average observed 
scores as a measure of selectivity arises from our assumption that latent achievement and the 
propensity to write the exam have a bivariate normal distribution within schools (or states).  If 
                                                 
11 Note that this approach requires that β not vary with t. 
12 The instrument does not predict changes in test taking rates in states that did not have a 
policy change.  See Appendix Table 1. this assumption is incorrect, even with fully exogenous variation in λ(θj) the coefficient that we 
obtain will not have a useful interpretation and will not permit a consistent estimate of αj.  In the 
appendix, we present several informal diagnostics meant to identify important violations of 
normality.  We find no indication that the bivariate normality assumption is importantly violated 
– polynomials in pj are not significant predictors of t j conditional on λ(θj), and the distribution of 
observed scores is quite similar to that implied by normality of pre-selection scores.   
 
V.  State-Level Analysis 
We begin by examining the selectivity of test participation within states.  Figure 1A 
displays the scatterplot of state-level SAT participation rates and mean SAT scores for the 1996 
cohort, distinguishing between SAT and ACT states. Consistent with previous analyses by 
Dynarksi (1987) and Dynarski and Gleason (1993), there is a strong inverse relationship between 
average scores and participation rates.  This inverse relationship is driven to a surprising degree, 
however, by the inclusion of ACT states; within the SAT states the participation-score 
correlation is much smaller.  The graph is thus suggestive of strong positive selection into SAT-
taking in the ACT states, as higher participation rates are associated with lower scores, and with 
weaker selection in SAT states.  This is consistent with the idea that in ACT states only high-
performing students who hope to attend elite out-of-state colleges take the SAT, while in SAT 
states all or most college-bound students take the exam.  Figure 1B displays the same scatterplot 
for the ACT (concorded to the SAT scale).  The overall negative correlation between test taking 
rates and average scores shown in the SAT data is not as apparent in the ACT data.   
Of course, it is possible that latent ability is correlated with test taking rates, which would 
affect the observed correlations between test-taking rates and observed scores.  For instance, if 




correlation between participation and observed scores is inflated, potentially masking a negative 
causal effect of participation on mean scores arising from positive within-state selection.   
To examine this, we turn to state-level NAEP scores, which are from tests taken by 
random samples of students in each state and are therefore not subject to the selection bias that 
may be reflected in SAT and ACT averages.  Table 2 presents regressions relating state-level 
score averages to inverse Mills ratios computed from state-level participation rates.  The top 
panel shows results for SAT states, with models for SAT scores in columns 1-3 and models for 
ACT scores in columns 4-6, and the bottom panel shows parallel results for ACT states. 
The estimates in columns 1 and 4 are consistent with the results shown in Figures 1A and 
1B:  Selection into participation is strongly positive for the SAT in ACT states, and nearly as 
strong (but much less precisely estimated) for ACT scores in ACT states.  Selection is weaker in 
SAT states, for both exams, and indistinguishable from zero for the ACT.  Columns 2 and 5 limit 
the sample to the set of states for which NAEP data on the math performance of random samples 
of 1992 8
th graders – the cohort that took entrance exams in 1996 – are available.  This has little 
effect, save that the insignificant SAT participation coefficient in SAT states changes sign.   
Columns 3 and 6 attempt to absorb the potential correlation between state-level 
participation rates and mean achievement by controlling for the average performance of the 
cohort in the state on the 8
th grade NAEP math exam in 1992.  The inclusion of this control does 
not dramatically change the point estimates (excepting again SAT scores in SAT states, where 
the IMR coefficient returns to its original value, still insignificant), though it does dramatically 
increase the regression goodness-of-fit and the added precision makes the IMR coefficient for 
ACT scores in ACT states significant.  There is clear evidence of positive selection into taking 
both exams in the ACT states, where the propensity to take each exam is correlated around 0.5  
13
with a student’s potential score.  Any selection is much weaker in SAT states, where the 
correlation is estimated around 0.1-0.2 but zero is well within the confidence intervals. 
 
VI.  Observational Analyses of Within-School Selection 
For many purposes, it is useful to distinguish between across-school variation in test 
participation rates and within-school selection, each of which can produce selectivity bias in state 
average scores.
13  In this section, we present observational analyses that distinguish these two 
sources of selection, first using cross-sectional analyses of the relationship between school-level 
test taking rates and average scores, then examining changes over time.  Each yields implausible 
estimates of the key within-school selectivity parameter, ρ, suggesting that the identifying 
restrictions are violated.  In the next section, we exploit the Illinois policy reform to identify 
within-school selectivity under more plausible assumptions.   
A.  Cross-sectional estimates 
Columns 1-4 of Table 3 present cross-sectional estimates of selectivity in 2000, as in 
equation (4).  The top panel shows results for SAT states, with two specifications estimated on 
SAT scores in columns 1-2 and the same specifications repeated for ACT scores in columns 3-4, 
while the bottom panel repeats the analysis for ACT states.  The first specification in each pair 
controls only for state fixed effects, while the second adds controls for the school racial 
composition and for the fraction of students at the school who are eligible for free school 
lunches.
14  The inverse Mills ratio coefficients are uniformly negative, though all are reduced 
                                                 
13 If the mean latent achievement is independent of the participation rate at the state level, 
the IMR coefficient from a state-level regression estimates (σα
2 + σε
2)




-1/2(σεσuρ + σασθcorr(α, θ)). 
14 Results from models that include county fixed-effects are quite similar.  
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notably by the addition of the demographic controls.  The IMR coefficient for ACT scores in 
SAT states is insignificant and near zero in this specification. 
If school participation rates are independent of mean latent scores, the negative 
relationship between IMRs and average scores indicates negative selection into test participation 
within schools—that is, that the weakest students in each school are the most likely to take the 
college entrance exams.  The ρ estimates are strongly negative for the dominant exam in a state 
and smaller for the secondary exam.  Estimates of the selectivity of SAT-writing in SAT states 
and of ACT-writing in ACT states are nearly identical.  As it is unlikely that test writers are 
actually negatively selected within schools, we conclude that the assumptions of the model are 
violated by strong across-school correlations between test-taking rates and mean achievement. 
B.  Time-differenced estimates 
One strategy for removing bias from endogeneity of the school-level participation rate is 
to focus only on changes over time in school-level participation rates and scores.  This strategy 
removes any fixed components of school quality, and identifies the selectivity parameters if 
changes in test participation are unrelated to changes in a school’s latent score.   
Columns 5-8 of Table 3 present estimates of the first-differenced regression, (6).  The 
coefficients on the change in inverse Mills ratio (and estimated ρ’s) are nearly all positive, but 
quite small.  This is particularly true in SAT states, where the estimated ρs are all less than 0.05.  
βs and ρs are somewhat larger in ACT states, but still indicate only minimal selectivity.   
The first-differenced specifications do not impose assumptions about the cross-sectional 
correlation between school mean latent scores (αjt) and propensity to write the exam (θjt), 
assuming only that the projection of αjt on λ(pjt) is the same in the two years.  It is thus possible 
to estimate the between-school selectivity of test participation, which we measure as corr(αjt, θjt).  
This is reported in the last row of each panel.  As our restriction that β be constant across years  
15
                                                
prevents this correlation from varying substantially over time, we report only the average 
correlation across 1994 and 2000.  This is substantial for the dominant test in each group of 
states – indicating that better schools have more test writers – but small for the secondary test. 
These first-differenced results, while more plausible than those obtained from the purely 
cross-sectional analysis, cannot be presumed to be consistent.  There is no particular reason to 
think that school quality is constant over this period, nor that changes in quality are for some 
reason unreflected in participation rates.  Changes in quality (or in school composition) would 
most likely produce a positive correlation between the change in θ and the change in α, biasing 
the selectivity estimates downward.   
 
VII.  The Illinois Policy Reform 
To isolate participation rate changes that are exogenous to changes in school quality, we 
take advantage of a policy change in Illinois, an ACT state.  Beginning in Spring 2001, all 
juniors in Illinois public high schools took the “Prairie State Assessment Examination” (PSAE), 
which included the ACT exam as one component.
15  The ACT was administered under the same 
conditions as are used for ordinary ACT administrations, and scores derived from the ACT 
component of the PSAE are counted as valid for most admissions purposes. 
The new requirement led to large increases in test participation in Illinois.  Changes in 
average observed scores accompanying this change in participation rates can identify the 
selectivity of test participation before the policy change.  This requires some care, as changes in 
IMRs cannot be treated as entirely exogenous to changes in school quality.  First, initial test-
taking rates varied substantially across schools.  As the new requirement had more “bite” in 
 
15 Students are not required to “pass” the PSAE, and the introduction of the test was not 
related to any other statewide changes in school policies.  Colorado introduced a similar program 
around the same time, but we focus on Illinois because the sample size is so much larger there.  
16
                                                
schools with lower initial participation rates, one might expect that schools with lower quality 
would have tended to see larger participation increases as they complied with the policy.  Any 
mean reversion in school quality would bias a first-differenced analysis that treated the change in 
IMRs as exogenous.  Second, compliance with the policy was incomplete.  The average 
participation rate, as calculated in our data, rose from 57% in 2000 to 89% in 2004.
16  If schools 
that complied fully differed in their quality from those that did not, this would again be a source 
of potential endogeneity of the change in test participation rates. 
Fortunately for our analysis, there are clear patterns in the impact of the policy that are 
plausibly unrelated to changes in school quality.  Figure 2 shows the scatterplot of participation 
rates against the school fraction white for Illinois high schools in 2000, before the Prairie State 
Assessment Exam was introduced, and in 2004.  We distinguish between the Chicago Public 
Schools and those in other Illinois districts, as the two groups differed substantially on both 
dimensions in 2000.
17  In the left panel, which uses 2000 data, there is a strong relationship 
between test participation rates and school racial composition, with much higher participation 
rates in schools with more white students.  This pattern is still present, but much weaker, in 
2004.
18  Thus, the increase in participation between 2000 and 2004 was most dramatic for the 
schools with the lowest white shares.   
 
16 The ACT Corporation reports that 99% of seniors in 2004 took the exam.  The 
difference likely has to do with the denominator.  We calculate the denominator from the 
Common Core of Data as the greater of the number of 12
th graders and the average number of 
students per grade.  If dropout rates are high, the average number of students per grade may 
over-state the number of potential test takers and lower the test taking rate. 
17 Chicago also implemented a variety of reforms in the years studied that might affect 
scores, test participation, or the distribution of students across schools.  See Jacob (2005).  All of 
our analyses of Illinois data allow for unrestricted differences between Chicago schools and the 
rest of the state in test score and participation changes between 2000 and 2004. 
18 The basic shape of the data is invariant to the use of the school’s 2000 racial 
composition on the horizontal axis in both years.  
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We exploit this feature of the data to generate variation in the “bite” of the Prairie State 
requirement that is plausibly exogenous to changes in school’s latent test scores.  Specifically, 
we use the school fraction black and fraction Hispanic in 2000 as instruments for the change in 
the school-level IMR between 2000 and 2004.
19  These are valid instruments if the relationship 
between school racial composition and mean latent score did not change over this time period.
20  
Table 4 presents several analyses of school ACT averages in Illinois.  The first column 
reports a cross-sectional model using 2000 data.  This is quite similar to the analogous model in 
Table 3, and like that indicates strong negative selection into test participation.  The second 
column replicates the first-differenced specification from Table 3 using changes between 1996 
and 2000 and just the Illinois data.  Like the earlier first-differenced models, this indicates 
approximately zero within-school selectivity and strong positive between-school selectivity. 
The remaining columns of Table 4 report first-differenced estimates from data spanning 
the Illinois policy change, relating changes in school mean test scores between 2000 and 2004 to 
changes in inverse Mills ratios.  Column 3 presents OLS estimates.  These combine the 
potentially endogenous variation that identifies the estimates in column 2 with exogenous 
 
19 Appendix Table 1 presents first-stage regressions of the change in school IMRs on the 
base-year school racial composition.  These have the sign implied by Figure 2.  The table also 
presents a first stage equation estimated using all ACT states except Illinois and Colorado (which 
implemented a similar policy change, but where we have been unable to identify a plausibly 
exogenous source of variation in the policy’s bite).  In this sample, the year-2000 racial 
composition of the school is not predictive of the 2000-2004 change in the school’s IMR.   
20 Data from the NAEP indicate that the black-white mathematics test score gap among 
Illinois 8
th graders grew by 2 points (on a scale with standard deviation 36) between 1990 and 
2005, while the Hispanic-white gap fell by 8 points over the same period.  If this trend holds 
equally across and within schools and if there are no spillover effects on white students in high-
minority-share schools, we will tend to overstate the within-school selection into participation 
slightly.  A back-of-the-envelope calculation indicates that this might account for as much as one 
fifth of the ρ estimates that we report below.  A second threat to the instruments’ validity is that 
racial composition in 2000 may be correlated with the change in racial composition over the next 
four years, which could be reflected in (or could itself reflect) changes in a school’s mean latent 
score.  Specifications reported in Appendix Table 1 control directly for the change in school 
racial composition, with little effect on the selectivity parameter of interest.  
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variation deriving from the policy change.  The estimates differ dramatically from those in 
Column 2, indicating a within-school correlation between participation and scores of 0.48.   
Column 4 presents the IV specification.  This indicates that falling IMRs (rising participation 
rates) produce large reductions in observed average test scores, corresponding to strong positive 
selectivity (ρ = 0.75) of students into test-taking within schools. 
We allow the across-school correlation between participation and latent scores – the 
between-school selectivity of test participation – to vary between 2000 and 2004.  Estimates of 
between-school selectivity are shown at the bottom of Table 4.  Those that take advantage of the 
policy change indicate year-2000 correlations that are notably larger than those from the 1996-
2000 analysis.  Correlations in 2004 are smaller than in 2000, consistent with the idea that the 
policy served to reduce the “signal” variation in test participation that might correlate with the 
quality of the school or its students. 
 
VIII. Implications for Analyses of Unadjusted Means 
The final component of our analysis is to draw out the implications of our results for 
analyses that, because they lack a source of exogenous variation in participation like that 
produced by the Illinois policy change, are unable to correct for selectivity of test participation.  
We cannot estimate the precise bias that this produces in analyses of observed averages without 
producing the exact specification that a researcher might attempt to estimate, but we can report 
some relevant correlations.  
The key parameters for school-level analyses are the correlation between the observed 
mean score at a school and the underlying latent mean, α, and the relative variances of the two 
measures.  To the extent that the correlation between the measures is large, schools with high 
observed scores will tend also to have high latent scores, and analyses that treat the observed mean score as a measure of the school’s quality will not be unduly affected by selection bias.  
That is, coefficient signs will likely be correct; if the variances of the two measures differ, the 
magnitude of estimated effects will be affected, in predictable ways.  
To see this, consider a regression that would be correctly specified if the dependent 
variable was true mean latent scores α, but suppose that the observed mean score t  is used 
instead.  Let R be the coefficient from a projection of  j t  onto αj.  Then if the true model is: 
(8)  αj = Xj*γ + νj,  
we can write (neglecting intercepts) 
(9)  j t  = αjR + ( j t  – αjR) = Xj* γ *R + νj + ( j t  – αjR).  
There are two biases introduced by using  j t  in place of αj as the dependent variable in 
(9).  First, the X coefficient, γ, is biased by a factor R due to the different scales of the two 
measures.  Second, the regression coefficient will be further biased if ( j t  – αjR) is correlated 
with X.  This correlation will vary with the choice of variables to include in X, of course.  The 
resulting bias, however, depends on this correlation as well as on the variance of ( j t  – αjR); the 
bias will necessarily be small if Var( j t  – αjR) = Var( j t )*(1-(corr( j t , αj))
2) is small. 
Table 5 presents various relevant parameters that are implied by the IV estimates in 
Table 4.  The first row repeats the within-school correlation, ρ.  The next several rows show 
estimates of the across-school standard deviations of average observed scores, mean latent 
scores, the school-level participation parameter θ, and the selection term in models for observed 
average scores, ρ*σ*λ(p).  All are computed from the same Illinois data used in Table 4.  In both 
2000 and 2004, the across-school standard deviation of mean observed scores is about 112 SAT 
points.  This is notably smaller than the standard deviation of latent scores, which is around 150 
in 2000 and 130 in 2004; comparing this to the within-school standard deviation (σ) of around 
 
19185 indicates that about 35% of the variance of latent test scores is between schools.  By 
comparison, the standard deviation of θ is around 0.6.  As the within-school variation in test 
participation is normalized to have variance one, this indicates that only about one quarter of the 
variation in test-taking propensity is between schools.  
The next row displays the overall selectivity of test participation, combining the across- 
and within-school components.  The estimate from the pre-reform period is 0.76, suggesting that 
test takers are strongly positively selected on the whole.  This is the relevant parameter for 
correcting state mean scores, supposing that the relative importance of within- and between-
school components of selectivity do not vary across states.  It is somewhat larger than the 
estimate obtained for all ACT states from our control function approach in Table 2. 
The next rows of Table 5 show the correlation between observed and latent scores, first 
unconditionally and then conditional on the school racial composition.  Unconditional 
correlations are 0.97 and 0.98 in the two years.  Conditional correlations are somewhat lower, 
but remain well above 0.9.  With such high correlations, (1-(corr( jt t ,  αj))
2 is quite small, 
implying that the omitted variable introduced by the use of observed means rather than latent 
means, ( jt t  – αjtR), has a standard deviation of only about 20 points.  Bias from the omission of 
this variable is likely to be negligible. 
The final row of the table shows R, the coefficient of a projection of latent means onto 
observed means.  This is 0.74 in 2000 and 0.86 in 2004.  Thus, coefficients in regressions like (9) 
will be attenuated relative to the true β by 14-26 percent, with the larger number more relevant in 
situations where test taking is optional.   
Of course, all of these estimates derive from models estimated from data on Illinois ACT-
takers.  They are dependent on the validity of the exclusion restrictions underlying our IV 
estimates, and even if these are valid, they may not generalize to other states or to SAT scores.   
 
20On the other hand, several patterns in the data suggests that the basic conclusion—that 
selection bias is unlikely to be an important determinant of the qualitative results of analyses that 
take school-mean test scores as the dependent variable—is likely to be quite robust.  Because 
test-taking rates are less variable than observed scores and because the two are so highly 
correlated, observed test scores are unlikely to be seriously misleading about rankings of states 
or schools even if selection into test participation is much more extreme than our estimates 
indicate.  As a final exercise, we computed latent scores under various assumptions about the 
selection coefficient, ρ.  Table 6 reports summaries of the association between these latent scores 
and observed school means in 2000, limiting the sample to schools with at least 50 students.  The 
first column reports the correlation between αj and  j t .  The second column reports the 
coefficient of a regression of the latter on the former.  The third and fourth columns repeat these 
measures, after first residualizing both α and  j t  against the school fraction white.   
Regardless of the value of ρ assumed, the correlation between observed and latent school 
means remains quite high, 0.95 when ρ = 1 and higher for smaller values of ρ.  Even after 
residualizing scores against the school racial composition – likely an important control variable 
in many analyses – these correlations are never lower than 0.88.  Regression coefficients are 
slightly more sensitive, reflecting the dependence of the variance of α on the ρ parameter, but 
even these are quite stable across a wide range of ρ values around the estimated value of 0.75. 
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We also explore specifications that vary the comparison group.  While the first panel of 
Table 6 uses all Illinois schools, the second panel limits computation of the statistics to the 
relatively homogenous subset of schools that serve the Chicago suburbs, and the third panel 
broadens the sample to all schools in ACT states (demeaning αj and  j t  separately for each state).  
While correlations are somewhat reduced in these samples, all remain extremely high:  When we 
use our estimated ρ, they range from 0.88 to 0.95; even when we assume that ρ = 1 the range is  
22
0.80 – 0.92.  With such high correlations, there is little room for substantive bias even when test 
scores are not corrected for selection into test participation. 
 
IX.  Conclusion 
Researchers often use college admissions test scores as measures of student achievement.  
But since only a select group of students take these tests, analyses that use observed score 
averages as a proxy for the mean latent test score may be biased.  Correcting the selection bias 
has been difficult: important unobserved variables likely impact both the propensity to take the 
test and the latent test score, and as a result standard selection corrections perform poorly.   
In this paper, we examine selectivity biases in both state-level and school-level SAT and 
ACT scores.  At the state level, selection appears to introduce important biases only in ACT 
states; in SAT states the correlation between the propensity to take the test and the latent score is 
small and the resulting selection bias is also small.  
Our school-level analysis uses a policy change in Illinois requiring all high school juniors 
to take the ACT as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in changes in participation rates 
over time.  We find that test takers are strongly positively selected both across and within 
schools:  Participation rates are higher at higher-performing schools, and within schools higher-
achieving students are more likely to take the test.  The across-school variation in latest test 
scores is large relative both to within-school variation in latent scores and to across-school 
variation in participation rates.  As a result, observed mean scores are highly correlated with 
latent means, and selectivity bias serves to attenuate variations in school mean scores but is 
unlikely to introduce further bias.  Thus, despite the strong selectivity of test participation, 
simple analyses using observed school-level test scores without controls for selectivity are 
unlikely to produce misleading results.   
23
    It remains for further analysis to investigate the validity of our Illinois-based estimates 
for data from other states.  Based on the patterns seen here, our expectation is that the results will 
generalize reasonably well to other ACT states.  If so, researchers would be justified in using 
unadjusted ACT averages as measures of student achievement, correcting for attenuation but not 
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Mean S.D. Mean Mean Mean S.D. Mean Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SAT
Mean score 978 100 1037 958 1104 145 1117 1096
School size 285 201 304 279 239 153 270 218
No. of test-takers 130 109 209 104 35 55 65 15
Participation rate 46% 21% 71% 38% 13% 14% 22% 7%
Fr. white 68% 31% 78% 64% 83% 23% 82% 84%
# of schools 5,167 1,291 3,876 1,882 756 1,126
ACT
Mean score (SAT scale) 970 122 983 962 963 89 999 949
School size 296 202 254 323 174 144 179 173
No. of test-takers 42 49 56 32 99 92 132 86
Participation rate 16% 15% 26% 9% 57% 16% 75% 50%
Fr. white 68% 30% 74% 64% 82% 26% 90% 78%
# of schools 4,143 1,654 2,489 4,050 1,147 2,903
Notes:  All data pertain to the 2000 cohort.  Sample includes only public schools with participation rates (on the SAT in the first 
panel or the ACT in the second panel) above 2%.  All statistics are computed from unweighted school-level data.  Samples in 
columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 are schools with participation rates on the relevant exam above and below the state-level participation rate.  
School size is the size of a single grade cohort at the school; see text for details.
All schools All schools
SAT States ACT states
 
 
27Table 2.  Cross-sectional estimates of state-level selectivity into test-taking, 1996
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:  SAT States
45.0 -40.7 38.7 28.4 30.5 21.2
(36.2) (26.7) (33.8) (10.9) (11.9) (18.4)
NAEP 8th grade math scores, 1992 2.0 1.0
(0.8) (1.4)
Exclude states without NAEP data? n y y n y y
N (states) 23 19 19 23 19 19
R2 0.06 0.05 0.39 0.11 0.19 0.21
Underlying parameters
  ρ 0.22 -0.20 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.11
  σ 200.4 199.9 199.6 195.0 195.3 194.3
Panel B:  ACT States
110.4 122.0 121.2 77.4 77.5 89.9
(21.6) (26.0) (16.4) (85.2) (96.5) (25.7)
NAEP 8th grade math scores, 1992 1.7 3.3
(0.4) (0.2)
Exclude states without NAEP data? n y y n y y
N (states) 25 21 21 25 21 21
R2 0.52 0.56 0.78 0.04 0.03 0.92
Underlying parameters
  ρ 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.40 0.40 0.46
  σ 213.8 219.0 218.6 193.4 193.4 196.3
Note:  Average ACT scores are computed from ACT micro-data, concorded to the SAT scale 
using the concordance developed by Dorans et al. 1999.
SAT scores vs. SAT 
participation
ACT scores vs. ACT 
participation
Inverse Mills Ratio in test-taking rate 
in state




28Table 3.  Cross-sectional and first-differenced estimates of within-school selectivity into test-taking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:  SAT states
-170.0 -68.5 -45.0 -2.7
(5.1) (4.7) (5.5) (4.2)
4.6 9.3 -0.4 1.2
(5.1) (4.8) (6.9) (6.9)
Controls
State FEs y y y y y y y y
Racial composition, fr. free lunch n y n y n y n y
N (schools) 5,167 5,167 4,143 4,143 4,076 4,076 3,122 3,122
R2 0.33 0.65 0.12 0.47 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03
Underlying parameters
ρ  -0.75 -0.36 -0.25 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01
σ 226.6 189.3 177.4 172.7 181.8 182.0 174.2 174.2
corr(α, θ) 0 0 0 0 0.49 0.50 0.08 0.08
Panel B:  ACT states
-25.0 -19.5 -158.6 -63.8
(6.3) (5.8) (6.4) (5.3)
18.2 20.0 19.4 22.3
(14.0) (14.1) (6.8) (6.8)
Controls
State FEs y y y y y y y y
Racial composition, fr. free lunch n y n y n y n y
N (schools) 1,882 1,882 4,050 4,050 1,132 1,132 3,286 3,286
R2 0.14 0.34 0.44 0.66 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03
Underlying parameters
ρ  -0.15 -0.11 -0.75 -0.36 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13
σ 171.2 170.6 211.1 179.6 172.0 172.1 173.0 173.2
corr(α, θ) 0 0 0 0 -0.04 -0.03 0.48 0.49
SAT scores ACT scores SAT scores ACT scores
Cross-sectional, 2000 First differenced, 1996-2000
Inverse Mills Ratio in test-taking rate at 
school, 2000
Change in Inverse Mills Ratio in test-
taking rate at school, 1996-2000
Inverse Mills Ratio in test-taking rate at 
school, 2000
Change in Inverse Mills Ratio in test-
taking rate at school, 1996-2000
 
 
29Table 4.  Selection estimates from Illinois data
OLS OLS OLS IV OLS IV





Chicago -160.1 12.2 57.7 67.8 59.6 75.9
(14.1) (5.3) (7.0) (11.8) (11.3) (15.9)
-140.0 -302.6
(22.4) (107.4)
N (schools) 390 390 390 390 390 390
R2 0.73 0.01 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.01
ρ -0.85 0.05 0.48 0.75
σ 228.7 174.9 183.4 199.0
corr(α, θ), 2000 -0.05 0.67 0.75 0.80
corr(α, θ), 2004 0.48 0.54
Notes:  Sample includes public schools with ACT participation rates above 2% and non-missing 
demographic information in each of 1996, 2000, and 2004.  Instruments in columns 4 and 6 are the 
fraction black and fraction Hispanic at the school in 2000.
1st difference, 2000-2004
Change in Inverse Mills Ratio in 
test-taking rate at school
Inverse Mills Ratio in test-











Within-school, individual-level correlation (ρ)






corr(α + ε, θ + u) 0.76 0.68
Across-school correlations
corr(tbar, α), unconditional 0.97 0.98
corr(tbar, α), conditional on racial composition 0.93 0.96
Regression of α on tbar 0.74 0.86
Table 5.  Relevant statistics for studies with imperfect selectivity 
controls implied by the Illinois analysis






Correlatio Reg. Correlation Reg.  coeff.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ρ = 0 11 1 1
ρ = 0.25 1.00 0.91 0.99 0.89
ρ = 0.5 0.99 0.81 0.97 0.77
ρ = 0.6 0.98 0.77 0.95 0.71
ρ = 0.75 0.97 0.71 0.93 0.63
ρ = 0.9 0.96 0.64 0.90 0.55
ρ = 1 0.95 0.59 0.88 0.49
ρ = 0 11 1 1
ρ = 0.25 0.99 0.87 0.98 0.87
ρ = 0.5 0.98 0.74 0.94 0.71
ρ = 0.6 0.97 0.69 0.91 0.65
ρ = 0.75 0.95 0.61 0.88 0.55
ρ = 0.9 0.93 0.54 0.83 0.46
   ρ = 1 0.92 0.49 0.80 0.40
ρ = 0 11 1 1
ρ = 0.25 0.99 0.91 0.99 0.91
ρ = 0.5 0.98 0.80 0.95 0.78
ρ = 0.6 0.97 0.75 0.93 0.72
ρ = 0.75 0.95 0.68 0.90 0.63
ρ = 0.9 0.92 0.61 0.86 0.54
   ρ = 1 0.91 0.55 0.83 0.48
Notes:  Schools with fewer than 50 students per cohort are excluded.  
"Residual scores" are residuals from regressions of mean scores and latent 
scores on the school fraction white.  The sample for these regressions is 
Illinois schools in the first two panels; all schools in ACT states (with state 
fixed effects) in the last panel.  Correlation and regression coefficients in the 
final panel are based on variables that have had a state mean removed.
Table 6.  Sensitivity of tbar-α relationship to ρ.
Scores Residual scores
All schools in ACT states 
All schools in Illinois (N=344)
Schools in chicago suburbs 
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